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
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Viet Nam

First Director of Agency Provided Information,

Not Decisions on Policy By RICHARD DUDMAN

A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 17 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara has built a reputation for having a factual an swer for every question. He will return to Washington in a few days

with some new factual answers on Viet Nam. He hinted at some of the answers before leaving Wednesday with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, on his sixth trip to Saigon -probable mobilization of reserves, larger

draft calls, extension of enlistments of

men on active duty, and additions this year to the military budget, President Lyndon B. Johnson has al ready forecast "new and serious decisions" in the war in Viet Nam, including the commitment of substantially more American fighting men. The President said that he would be in a better position to decide how many after McNamara and Lodge

HOW MANY AMERICAN troops will i

have returned.

take to win the war in Viet Nam? An official who has watched the war ex pand in the last four years says: "McNamara's successive answers to that question have been the story of the buildup of American forces in Viet Nam. He said 12,000 would do it, then 16,000, then 24,000 then 40,000, and now it's up to 200,000."

The buildup now has reached 71,000, with the announced strength by the end of this month set at about 83,000. Officials here and in Saigon have been speaking for sev eral weeks of a total of several hundred

thousand by the end of the year. McNamara was asked at his press conference Wednesday what method he used to decide on increases. Had he estimated future needs earlied phorography discover the need for more troops from time to time as news of the fighting came sions." Secretary of State Dean Rusk is

"Well, a little bit of both, I think. The situation is changing. And as it changes we must change our plans. At any given (time, we assign forces to South Viet Nam; in relation to a military plan that has been established and approved by the appropriate constitutional authorities. That plan remains in effect, and we supply forces in accordance with it until the situation !

His answer is worth quoting in full:

"Changes in the situation are beyond our control. What action the North Viet Namese will take in accordance with these statements I have just read to you, I cannot predict.

"ALL I CAN SAY is that at any particular time we will have a plan to respond to our best estimate of their actions, and we will modify that plan when we see indications that they are changing their own plans."

McNamara's explanation put changes in the war in terms of changes in enemy plans-increased infiltration from North Viet Nam and more aggressive patterns of 🖟

Conversations with many military men on the scene a few months ago indicated ! that other American estimates are being revised.

There is a growing view that the United States has been underestimating the stamina of the Viet Cong and its ability to command support in the countryside.

-their willingness and ability to fight, to learn and to cultivate the support of the Vict Namese people. An American general, returning home after a tour of duty in Viet Nam, ridiculed in private conversation the performance of

Viet Namese troops at all levels in fighting for their country. In short, there has been a growing belief by American military men that the Viet Namese are not willing or able to fight their own war effectively and that the

United States must do it for them. In contrast to that view, McNamara has been telling Representatives and Senators that the Viet Namese can handle the situation with a moderate amount of American help. He has been advising them to wait until the monsoon season is over in October; if the Viet Cong can be held back until then, there ought to be an upturn.

McNAMARA HAS BEEN a strong advocate of bombing selected targets in North Viet Nam in an effort to persuade Hanoi to call off the war in the south.

But he is understood to have resisted pressure to bomb targets in the immediate Hanoi area. It is understood, further, that McNamara pressed hard for a "diplomatic initiative" to accompany the new bombing Amenas in 2005 108 103 le Op Ato ROF Johnson's offer of unconditional discus-

McNamara's position is relatively mode; erate, in tune with his doctrine of "controlled response." He has been quoted as saying that retaliation for its own sake is irrational, that it should be selective and contolled—"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a Minsk for a Hartford." Other high officials have been calling for

"an eye for a tooth." The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William F. Raborn Jr., has already become known as one who presses On the other side of the equation, the

for a massive military response. He is view is growing that too much has been expected of the South Viet Namese forces said to have been the first to urge President Johnson to send a big force to the Dominican Republic. A SOURCE FAMILIAR with recent policy discussions on Viet Nam quotes Raborn as

advocating "a Rotterdam policy decision on what will be the Spolicy in the south." By that, IT STILL IS a sharply limited Raborn said that he meant the operation. The United States saturation bombing of Hanoi and will have only 36,500 comba the dispatch to South Viet Nam troops in Viet Nam by the end of five times as many troops as of July, compared to more than 300,000 in Korea at the peak o seemed necessary. The CIA and Defense Depart that war.

ments have increased their in Despite Rusk's statement last fluence in strategy discussions in Sunday that "the idea of sancture teent years, informed officials ary is dead" in the Vict Namese say. They affirshute this develop say. They attribute this develop war, American bombers stil ment to a reluctance by Secre- avoid targets in North Viet Nam tary Rusk to initiate policies or where Russian or Chinese troops

tion was to provide information as a basis for policy, not to make policy or carry it out.

"We cannot win with mere The approaching decisions on military force for guns canno

of duty, in this and the control of the duty stomachs, napalm timuing buildup of forces in Viet cannot teach a child to read," he Nam are all facets of a larger said in a speech last May a

take strong positions. are stationed. House Republicar Sidney W. Souers, who helped leaders have been urging an end organize the CIA and was its to this restriction. first director, steadfastly refused requests from President Harry (Dem.), New York, called again

Senator Robert F. Kennedy S Truman that he settle differ this week for a return to the ences among cabinet members. counter-insurgency program de Souers contended that his func-John F. Kennedy and now al but abandoned.